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Introduction
Macroprudential policies are increasingly becoming part of the standard policy toolkit to maintain financial stability. At the same time, the understanding of the functioning of these instruments is still limited. The literature trying to assess the impact of macroprudential measures is still in its infancy. In particular, there are very few studies dealing with the European Union. Methodologically, any estimation must deal with the inherent endogeneity problem: Policymakers typically implement measures in response to systemic risk, indicated, e. g., by excessive credit growth. Hence, measures are likely to be influenced by the target variables themselves, thereby creating reverse causality. This may result in an estimation bias such that the policies' effectiveness may be underestimated (Kuttner and Shim, 2016 ).
2
The common solution is to employ a panel GMM estimator. 2 While this is in principle a valid solution, it may not always be an ideal one. Panel GMM estimators are susceptible to the weakinstrument problem (Bun and Windmeijer, 2010) . Furthermore, they yield an abundance of econometric instruments since their number grows quite rapidly with the time dimension. As a result, the model can be overfitted and tests for the validity of instruments may be impaired (Roodman, 2009) .
We offer an alternative in the form of a simple instrumental variable (IV) approach. IV estimation is often not feasible due to a lack of suitable instruments. We propose a new instrument based on the institutional arrangement of national macroprudential policy and present estimations employing the new approach to EU data. Our IV results show that borrowerbased macroprudential measures have a strong and statistically significant effect on credit growth. The results are robust to a variety of specifications.
Empirical Strategy
Our IV approach is based on the idea that a politically sensitive macroprudential measure is more likely to be implemented if a politically independent institution is in charge. Hence, we expect that countries are more likely to implement measures like LTV-or DSTI-ratios if the central bank plays a larger role in macroprudential supervision. 3 Borrower-based measures, in particular, are politically more controversial because they directly interfere with the contractual freedom of banks and their customers. At the same time, we do not expect such institutional arrangements to affect credit growth directly. Furthermore, institutional arrangements are predetermined. This makes the involvement of the central bank in macroprudential supervision a valid instrument.
To quantify the involvement of the central bank in the EU, we use a recommendation of the ESRB (2011) on the macroprudential mandate of national authorities and its following assessment. The ESRB has recommended that the central bank plays a leading role in macroprudential policy (sub-recommendation "B3"). After three years, the ESRB (2014) assessed quantitatively to which degree member states have fulfilled this recommendation (see Table 1 ). 4
Our econometric specification is similar to Claessens et al. (2013) . We first consider an IV regression based on bank-level data from all 28 EU member states:
Second stage:
denotes gross loan growth of bank in country at time t. We include a lagged dependent variable to control for natural persistence. is an index of macroprudential policy that is based on the ESRB's documentation of macroprudential policies in the EU. 5 Due to data restrictions, we are constrained to a one-period analysis on the micro-level. To test our instrument with an expanded time dimension, we resort to macro-data as a robustness check. controversial. An activation of an additional borrower-based measure leads to a statistically and economically significant decrease in bank loan growth by 3 to 4 percentage points on average, while the effect is statistically insignificant in the OLS estimation. Control variables enter with the expected sign or insignificantly.
Results

As shown in
The results are robust to a number of different specifications (Table 3) . First, we include additional controls, namely bank profitability (return over assets), bank size (logarithm of assets), the sovereign debt-to-GDP ratio, sum of imports and exports in terms of GDP, and the current account balance to GDP (see Claessens et al., 2013) , which lowers the size and statistical significance of coefficients (columns 1 and 2). However, borrower-based measures still have economically significant effects. Second, we include additional controls and use unweighted data, which leaves results largely unchanged compared to the baseline (columns 3 and 4). Third, we use macro data from 2011Q1 to 2016Q4 (columns 5 and 6). These regressions yield very similar results to the baseline regressions at bank level.
Conclusion
The role of the central bank in macroprudential policy matters. This insight leads us to a new identification strategy to assess the efficacy of borrower-based macroprudential measures in the EU. The strategy helps to avoid the inherent endogeneity problem while circumventing the difficulties of GMM estimation techniques. Thereby, our paper adds to the literature on the efficacy of macroprudential measures. It provides evidence for EU countries that borrowerbased macroprudential measures dampen credit growth. This is particularly relevant amid growing vulnerabilities in European residential real estate markets (ESRB, 2016) . Table 1 ) in the first-stage regression. "F-value (first-stage)" denotes the F-statistic for the significance of the excluded instrument B3 in the first-stage regression. Notes: Table shows second-stage regressions of the IV estimation. Regressions using macro data include timefixed effects. All regressions use robust standard errors. p-values in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10 %, 5 % and 1 % levels. In case of "more controls" and "unweighted", the dependent variable is bank gross loan growth in 2015. The source for bank-level data is Orbis Bank Focus. In case of macro data the dependent variable is (annualized) quarterly real credit growth of the private sector. Data span from 2011Q1 to 2016Q4. Sources for aggregate variables are ECB (private credit growth), Eurostat (sovereign debt ratio), AMECO (real GDP growth), World Bank (trade volumes and current account balances) and national central banks (policy rates). "F-value (first-stage)" denotes the F-statistic for the significance of the excluded instrument B3 in the first-stage regression.
